Interest  and the Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Law and Finance by El-Gamal, Mahmoud A.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 27, Issue 1 2003 Article 6
”Interest” and the Paradox of Contemporary
Islamic Law and Finance
Mahmoud A. El-Gamal∗
∗
Copyright c©2003 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
”Interest” and the Paradox of Contemporary
Islamic Law and Finance
Mahmoud A. El-Gamal
Abstract
In Sections 1 and 2, the article shall provide a brief introduction to various notions of Islamic
law as they exist today, as well as the common-law nature of Islamic jurisprudence to establish the
possibility of finding a compromise that renders minor modifications of the existing juristic posi-
tions coherent. In Sections 3 and 4, the article will provide translations of the entire Azhar Islamic
Research Institute (IRI) fatwa, and large excerpts from the Council of the Islamic Jurisprudence
Academy’s (IJA) rebuttal together with discussions of the juristic backgrounds of each opinion.
In Section 5, the author will discuss the ideological roots of contemporary Islamic finance, which
continue to shape Muslim views, both for jurists and lay people, regarding interest and permissible
profit. In Section 6, the author will provide a brief survey of the most prominent Islamic financial
instruments, illustrating the incoherence of juristic views that denounce “interest” and yet main-
tain that Islamic finance is “interest-free.” Lastly, the author will conclude by proposing a possible
compromise between the two extreme views espoused by the IRI fatwa and the IJA rebuttal, which
would allow for a coherent juristic and financial nexus in Islamic finance.
"INTEREST" AND THE PARADOX OF
CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC
LAW AND FINANCE
Mahmoud A. El-Gamal*
Often, the true grounds of legal decision are concealed rather than
illuminated by the characteristic rhetoric of opinions. Indeed, legal
education consists primarily of learning to dig beneath the rhetorical
surface to find those grounds, many of which may turn out to have
an economic character.
[Tihe manner in which an act was qzvalified as morally good or bad
in the spiritual domain of Islamic religion was quite different from
the manner in which that same act was qualified as legally valid or
invalid in the temporal domain of Islamic law. Islamic law was secu-
lar, not canonical .... Thus, it was a system focused on ensuring
that an individual received justice, not that one be a good person.2
I tell you, truthfully and without pretense, . .. that we went beyond
choosing the "bank" label [in "Islamic Banking"], to the point of
adapting its central essence.... Consequently, we failed to give our
financial institutions any characteristics beyond simple financial in-
termediation. This is accomplished through Islamic banks' favorite
investment modes that are essentially a hybrid between loans and in-
vestment; which hybrid carries most of the characteristics of usurious
loans ..
INTRODUCTION
Almost all contemporary writings in Islamic law and Islamic
finance proclaim that Islamic law [Shari'ah] forbids interest.
This statement, however, is paradoxical in light of the actual
practices of Islamic financial providers over the past three de-
cades. In fact, the bulk of Islamic financial practices formally
base rates of return or costs of capital on a benchmark interest
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1. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 23 (4th ed. 1992).
2. John A. Makdisi, The Islamic Origins of the Common Law, 77 N.C. L. REV'. 1635,
1704 (1999).
3. Saleh Kamel, Remarks at Acceptance Speech for the Islamic Development Bank
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rate such as the London Inter-bank Offer Rate ("LIBOR"), and
would easily be classified by any Masters of Business Administra-
tion ("MBA") student as interest-based debt financing. Never-
theless, jurists on the payrolls of Islamic financial providers con-
tinue to proclaim all forms of interest as riba [usury], which is
subject to the most severe Qur'anic prohibition. As this Article
will illustrate, the dual role of jurists (who both condemn con-
ventional interest-based financing and support and personally
profit from its "Islamic twin") is supported through an exces-
sively formalistic interpretation of Islamic law.
Minority opinions, which permit modern forms of interest,
have surfaced from time to time and are occasionally champi-
oned by holders of highly respectable (though, often politically
appointed) religious posts. Perhaps the oldest such pronounce-
ment was made by Ebusuud Efendi, the Mufti of Istanbul be-
tween 1545 and 1574 C.E., and holder of the title Seyhiilislam,
towards the end of his tenure. Ebusuud defended the act of in-
terest-taking, especially by awqaf [pious foundations], as a practi-
cal matter of necessity.' As expected, this minority opinion,
while sanctioned by the Ottoman Sultan Suleyman, was rejected
by the majority of Muslim scholars around the Arab world who
continued to favor interest-free lending and traditional partner-
ship forms of finance. Consequently, European modes of bank-
ing only became commonly practiced in the Islamic world dur-
ing the eighteenth century. Even then, the widespread adoption
of Western banking practices appears to have been driven by ex-
ternal forces.
Most recently, Sheikh-al-Azhar Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi
re-iterated a fatwa [an issued opinion in response to a question
regarding Islamic law] that he had issued in 1989, and published
in the semi-official newspaper, Al-Ahram, when he was the Mufti
[an official expounder of Islamic law] of Egypt.6 This most re-
cent fatwa, carrying the support of the Azhar Islamic Research
4. See Rev. M. MacColl, Are Reforms Possible Under Mussulman Rule? (1881) (un-
published mimeograph, on file with author).
5. See SEVKET PAMUK, A MONETARY HIsTORY OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE 78-82 (2000).
6. See Chibli Mallat, Tantawi on Banking Operations in Egypt, in IsLAMIc LEGAL INTER-
PRETATION: MuFriS AND THEIR FATWAS 286 (Muhammad Khalid Masud et al. eds., 1996)
(discussing 1989 fatwa). Numerous Islamic writers attacked Tantawi for this fatwa,
which was dismissed by the Pakistani Shari'ah Appellate Court as "the solitary opinion
of Dr. Tantawi of Egypt." (court document on file with author); see also, ALi AL-SALUS,
AL-IQTISAD AL ISLAMI WA AL-QADAYA AL-FIQHIYYAH AL-MU 'ASIRAH 356-410 (Dar al-
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Institute ("IRI" or [Majma' al-Buhuth al-Islamiyyah]), of which
Tantawi was Rector, differed little substantively from its prede-
cessors. Indeed, parts of its text seem to be copied verbatim
from a book on banking operations that Tantawi published well
before the elicitation of this recent fatwa by the Chairman of a
bank's board of directors.
One interesting aspect of the two opinions of Tantawi and
the IRI is that they both exclusively deal with the relationship
between bank depositors and banks, without addressing the na-
ture of banks' assets.7 The essence of the fatwa is that bank de-
positors should be viewed as passive investors and banks should
be viewed as their investment agents. The problem of interest
on bank deposits is thus reduced to one which permits pre-speci-
fying the "profits" to which depositors are entitled as a percent-
age of the capital, instead of specification as a percentage of ac-
tually realized profits. This constitutes a violation of the classical
rules of the silent partnership contracts known as mudarabah or
qirad.8
Semi-official Egyptian press hailed the fatwa as "declaring
bank interest licit,"9 even though the authors of the fatwa clearly
exerted effort in its wording and conceptualization to avoid us-
ing the term "interest" [fa'ida, or fawa'id in plural form]. Sup-
porters of Islamic finance were outraged by the fatwa and de-
spite numerous earlier rejections of its substance, demanded a
prompt official rebuttal by the largest possible Islamic juristic
body. A month later, inJanuary 2003, the Council of the Islamic
Jurisprudence Academy ("IJA" or [Majma' al-Fiqh al-Islami]) is-
sued a rebuttal, reiterating many of the points made by its mem-
bers and numerous other jurists in rejecting the Islamic legiti-
macy of all forms of bank interest.
Such scholarly debates are abundant in every religious tradi-
Thaqafah 1998) (exemplifying numerous personal attacks against Tantawi based on
questioning Tantawi's knowledge, piety, and incentives).
7. Many have correctly noted that both opinions were issued during periods when
the Egyptian government was worried about lack of saving mobilization. However, this
Article focuses on the concepts and methods invoked by the opinions' proponents and
opponents, rather than the incentives of each.
8. These terms are analogous to the Medieval European commenda contract and
the Jewish heter isqa.
9. See, e.g., Iqbal A-Siba'i, A Slap to the Face of Extremists and Peddlers of Religion:
Finally, Bank Interest is Permissible, RoSE AL-YUSUF, Dec. 13, 2002, at 18-21; Gamal Tayib,
Now, Shall We Cancel Islamic Banking?, RosE AL-YUSUF, Dec. 13, 2002, at 22.
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tion. What is puzzling in this instance, however, is the very na-
ture of the brand of "Islamic finance" that the majority of jurists
support as an alternative to the forbidden interest-based finan-
cial model. In fact, the IJA arguments correctly illustrate the in-
coherence of the IRI's fatwa. The IRI fatwa focuses on the liabil-
ities (deposit) side of banks and ignores the fact that the bulk of
conventional banks' assets (or, in their language, investments)
take the form of interest-bearing loans. However, all jurists, in-
cluding Tantawi and others at AI-Azhar who supported the fatwa
- denounce interest-bearing loans as forbidden riba. On the
other hand, the IJA's own position, which is in accordance with
the majority ofjurists who denounce conventional interest-based
finance, yet support the contemporary "Islamic" alternative, also
seems incoherent upon further examination of the practices of
Islamic financial institutions on both sides of the balance sheet.
In Sections 1 and 2, I shall provide a brief introduction to
various notions of Islamic law as they exist today, as well as the
common-law nature of Islamic jurisprudence to establish the
possibility of finding a compromise that renders minor modifica-
tions of the existing juristic positions coherent. In Sections 3
and 4, I provide translations of the entire Azhar IRI fatwa, and
large excerpts from the IJA's Council rebuttal together with dis-
cussions of the juristic backgrounds of each opinion. In Section
5, I discuss the ideological roots of contemporary Islamic fi-
nance, which continue to shape Muslim views, both for jurists
and lay people, regarding interest and permissible profit. In
Section 6, I provide a brief survey of the most prominent Islamic
financial instruments, illustrating the incoherence of juristic
views that denounce "interest" and yet maintain that Islamic fi-
nance is "interest-free." Lastly, I will conclude by proposing a
possible compromise between the two extreme views espoused
by the IRI fatwa and the IJA rebuttal, which would allow for a
coherent juristic and financial nexus in Islamic finance.
1. Questions of Authority: A Hierarchy of Islamic Laws
In contemporary Muslim societies, one may speak of a num-
ber of different Islamic laws. The lack of a widely accepted con-
temporary legal codification based on Islamic jurisprudence
makes it difficult to speak with any authority regarding the Is-
lamic permissibility or prohibition of any given transaction.
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Ironically, it is precisely this legal vacuum that allows many indi-
viduals to authoritatively speak on those subjects. The source of
this authority may be a post to which the speaker was politically
appointed, academic credentials sanctioned by a community of
scholars, or public support from the laity.
Officially "Islamized" States, such as Iran, Pakistan and Su-
dan, produce a codified variant of Islamic law that plays a central
role in the legitimacy of ruling regimes. These laws constitute
the first position in the hierarchy of Islamic law. In the area of
finance, for example, this issue has been most prominent in Pa-
kistan, which in the past two decades has witnessed a series of
banking laws, and Shari'ah Appellate Court rulings (most re-
cently overruled by the Supreme Court), all aiming to "eradicate
interest." The financial systems in those States are therefore po-
litically mandated to operate on an interest-free basis despite the
lack of a coherent demarcation between what is "interest-based"
and what is "interest-free." Many of the early innovations in Is-
lamic finance (e.g., alternatives to government bonds) were ad-
vanced in those countries. However, the recent growth of Is-
lamic finance has been mainly driven by advances made in Ma-
laysia and the Gulf Cooperation Council ("GCC")'t countries,
most recently with the assistance of multinational financial behe-
moths like Citigroup and HSBC.
The second hierarchical level of Islamic law is represented
by the Islamic law of Muslim States", some of which have long
declared Islamic law as their source of legislation. In the area of
finance, Islamic sources of transaction law continue to rely heav-
ily on Majallat al-Ahkam al-'Adliyyah.12 Even in countries where
the Majallat was never enforced, like in Egypt, its general juristic
rules continue to be quoted by official judges and jurists of all
schools. Of course, the actual civil codes in most Muslim coun-
tries owe less to Islamic jurisprudence than to European civil
codes. Turkey based its civil codes on Swiss law in 1926 while
10. See GCC Countries, available at http://www.sheikhmohammed.co.ae/english/
history/history-arabia.asp (noting that the Gulf Cooperation Council ("GCC") was
founded on May 26, 1981 in order to achieve unity between member States which in-
clude Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and United Arab Emirates).
11. These States include Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, etc..
12. This codification of Islamic jurisprudence was commissioned and imposed by
the Ottoman Empire in its final days (1869-1926 C.E.) and based on Hanafi jurispru-
dence.
2003] CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE 113
Egypt, Syria and Iraq implemented predominantly French-based
civil codes. '
Paralleling increased general levels of religiosity in Muslim
societies, the late twentieth century witnessed a revival of Islamic
law at the official, governmental level. Article 2 of the Egyptian
Constitution, amended in May 1980, stated that all subsequent
laws and legislations must be derived from Islamic law. This con-
stitutional requirement was further strengthened through the
following Egyptian Constitutional Court's ruling:
It is therefore not permitted that a legislative text contradict
those rules of Shari'ah whose origin and interpretation are
definitive, since these rules are the only ones regarding which
new interpretive effort (ijtihad) is impossible, as they re-
present, in Islamic Shari'ah, the supreme principles and fixed
foundations that admit neither allegorical interpretation, nor
modification. In addition, we should not contemplate that
their meaning would change with changes in time and place,
from which it follows that they are impermeable to any
amendment, and that it is not permitted to go beyond them
or change their meaning. The authority of the High Consti-
tutional Court in this regard is limited to safeguarding their
implementation and overruling any other legal rule that con-
tradicts them.1 4
In Saudi Arabia, there have been a number of lawsuits in
which one counter-party refused to pay interest or delayed pen-
alty payments on the basis of the prohibition of nba, despite the
fact that such payments were contractually stipulated. A number
of lawsuits between non-Saudi and Saudi counterparties are cur-
rently underway, and precisely revolve around whether or not
Islamic law forbids interest payments or late payment penalties.'"
The revival of a manifested (if not real) desire to implement
Islamic law at the official level gave rise to international juristic
councils most notably:
0 The Institute of Islamic Research [Majma' Al-Buhuth Al-Is-
13. See OUSSAMA ARABI, STUDIES IN MODERN IsLAMic LAw 21, 39-42, 63-65 (2001).
Egypt and Syria implemented such civil codes in 1949 while Iraq implemented its own
in 1953.
14. Id. at 196.
15. Since those cases are still in progress, it is premature to disclose their
counterparties or document the arguments used by each side.
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lamiyyah] at AI-Azhar University, established in Cairo in
1961
* The Islamic Jurisprudence Institute [Al-Majma'A1-Fiqhi Al-
Islami] of the Islamic League [Rabitat Al-'Alam Al-Islami],
established in Mecca in 1979
* The Fiqh Institute or Academy [Majma' AI-Fiqh Al-Islami]
of the Organization of Islamic Conference ("OIC":
[Munazammat Al-Mu'tamar Al-Islami]), established in 1984
with a home inJeddah, Saudi Arabia. This is currently the
most widely cited jurisprudential council, which is com-
prised of representatives from Islamic members of the
OIC
Members of these institutes are appointed by their respective
governments. Consequently, the third level of the aforemen-
tioned hierarchy, Islamic law pronouncements by those insti-
tutes are to some extent rooted in official status.
The Islamic law pronouncements at the three official levels
(i.e., Islamized national level, Islamic law within Muslim Nations,
and international institute level) often contradict one another.
For instance, the Malaysian Islamic banking laws allowed for
trading in debt [bay' al-dayn], which allowed them to develop a
relatively sophisticated "Islamic money market." By contrast, ju-
rists from Muslim States and jurisprudence institutes, most of
whom were from the Arab world and Pakistan, rejected this type
of debt-trading. Consequently, Malaysian Islamic finance has re-
cently moved in the direction of increased conservatism (if only
in formalistic terms), in order to build an international Islamic
money market for the Nation's bonds and other financial instru-
ments. Simultaneously, innovations in the Arab world permitted
so-called ijara [leasing] and salam sukuk [bonds] which can serve
as an alternative basis for the Islamic money market.
A fourth category, labeled "Islamic law," adds another level
of complexity to Islamic finance. This category has been en-
dorsed by popular jurists who frequently rely on medieval litera-
ture in Islamic jurisprudence and frequently quote canonical
texts to support these earlier opinions. The influence of these
jurists has increased exponentially in recent years through satel-
lite television channels and internet forums. Their following ac-
cepts the maxim that "Islam is for all times and places,"' 6 thus
16. With sufficient flexibility in the definition of what constitutes Islam, this state-
ment would be rendered tautological. With sufficient rigidity, it would be rendered
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giving those medieval texts, which were mostly driven by the con-
temporary concerns of their authors, current authoritativeness. 17
Some of the "fathers" of Islamic economics (the ideological
dogma that gave rise to contemporary Islamic finance) belonged
to this class of popular religious figures who had significant fol-
lowings during their lifetimes which grew even larger posthu-
mously.'" Contemporary popular jurists 9 mainly follow in the
footsteps of the founders of this populist view of "Islam as a way
of life" and its manifestation in Islamic finance.
A fifth and final category of Islamic law, embodied by the
views espoused by amateur jurists, is responsible for the exis-
tence and growth of Islamic finance. Despite the clergy-like sta-
tus granted to popular jurists and in certain circles also granted
official and semi-official jurists, Islamic jurisprudence does re-
quire the questioner to seek knowledge directly. While large
portions of the Muslim populations of various countries are will-
ing to accept the opinions of a particular jurist or institute
blindly, a growing number of lay people seek to educate them-
selves about the various opinions and their bases in classical Is-
lamic law. This is facilitated in large part by the affordability and
availability of classical Islamic texts in print and electronic me-
dia. In fact, many of the "scholars" serving on the "Shari'ah
boards" of various providers of Islamic financial instruments
have no formal degrees in Islamic transactions law. Rather,
patently false. Champions of this slogan span the entire spectrum of degrees of flexibil-
ity between those two extremes. In the arena of Islamic finance, this fact allows for
profitable market segmentation according to the degree of conservatism of its adher-
ents. See generally Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, The Economics of 21st Century Islamic Jurispru-
dence, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH HARVARD UNIVERSITY FORUM ON ISLAMIC FINANCE
(Harv. Islamic Fin. Info. Program et al. eds., 2002) (providing formal model of phe-
nomenon, which also explains some paradoxical behavior ofjurists discussed in Arti-
cle).
17. Claims like those of the Egyptian Constitutional Court quoted above - pro-
fessing that the canonical texts are immutable, eternally applicable, and can easily
morph into claims that are classical interpretations of those texts, or majority interpre-
tations thereof - are equally authoritative. See, e.g., KHALED M. ABOU Ei. FADL, AND
GOD KNOWS THE SOLDIERS (2001) (providing analysis of contemporary problems regard-
ing authoritativeness in Islamic discourse).
18. For example, this group includes Abu al-A'la al-Mawdudi, Baqir al-Sadr, and
Sayyid Qutb, who also, and perhaps unsurprisingly, fathered contemporary political Is-
lam in their respective countries and beyond.
19. Contemporary popular jurists include Taqi Usmani in Pakistan, with close ties
to Mawdudi's Jamat-i-Islami and Yusuf al-Qaradawi in Qatar, with close ties to Quth's
Muslim Brotherhood in his native Egypt, etc..
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these "scholars" are mostly self-educated lay people and general-
istjurists who have helped facilitate a difficult discourse between
bankers on the one hand, and religious law texts on the other.
The bridges now built by those amateur jurists may assist for-
mally trained Islamic legal scholars to understand the basics of
contemporary finance, and help them build the much needed
transition from classical books of jurisprudence to a contempo-
rary, relevant, and coherent jurisprudence of financial transac-
tions.2" Unfortunately, as the recent episode discussed in this
Article illustrates, the rhetoric used by amateur and professional
jurists continues to obscure the relevant facts and keep that
much-desired goal beyond reach.
2. Islamic Transactions Law as Common Law
Even though contemporary writings on Islamic transactions
law always cite canonical texts (the Qur'an and the prophetic
Sunnah) to support their opinions, Islamic transactions law is a
common law system at heart. Indeed, by the admission of the
very jurists working in this field, contemporary developments in
Islamic finance owe more to contemporary juristic understand-
ings of the canonical texts and previous juristic analyses, than
they owe to the canon itself:
It must be understood that when we claim that Islam has a
satisfactory solution for every problem emerging in any situa-
tion in all times to come, we do not mean that the Holy
Qur'an or the Sunnah of the Holy Prophet (SW) or the rul-
ings of the Islamic scholars provide a specific answer to each
and every minute detail of our socio-economic life. What we
mean is that the Holy Qur'an and the Holy Sunnah of the
Prophet ... have laid down broad principles in the light of
which the scholars of every time have deduced specific an-
swers to the new situation arising in their age. Therefore, in
order to reach a definite answer about a new situation the
scholars of Shari'ah have to play a very important role. They
have to analyze every new question in light of the principles
laid down by the Holy Qur'an and Sunnah as well as in the
20. The current context of Islamic law and finance, which evolves through fatawa
(plural of fatwa) instead of formal codification, is particularly problematic for the de-
sired coherence opinions. It is the nature of fatawa to be given for a specific time and
specific set of circumstances. Therefore, a collection of fatawa is highly unlikely to
exhibit any degree of internal consistency and coherence.
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light of the standards set by the earlier jurists, enumerated in
the books of Islamic jurisprudence. This exercise is called Is-
tinbat or Ijtihad .... [T] he ongoing process of Istinbat keeps
injecting new ideas, concepts and rulings into the heritage of
Islamic jurisprudence .... 21
In other words, Islamic jurists, by "injecting new ideas, con-
cepts and rulings," make law in a manner very similar to com-
mon law judges presiding over cases that lack common law
precedents. In addition, it is worthwhile to note that the process
of ijtihad, discussed above, is restricted mainly to reasoning by
analogy (juristic rather than logical), following the rules of Is-
lamic legal theory as established by Al-Shafi and widely followed
in all juristic schools:
1323 - He said: What is analogy (qiyas)? Is it the same as ij-
tihad, or are they two separate notions?
1324 - I (Al-Shaf'i) said: they are synonyms.
1325 - He said: So what is in common between them?
1326 - I said: Everything which was revealed for the Muslims
contains either a binding command, or a legal proof upon
which future rulings can be based to uphold truth and justice.
Thus, if revelation gave us a direct ruling [regarding the mat-
ter at hand], Muslims must follow that ruling; and if revela-
tion did not make a ruling on this specific matter, then a
proof for the just and true ruling must be sought via ijtihad.
And, ijtihad is qiyas.22
This emphasis on precedent and reasoning by juristic analogy
gave rise to a body of transactions law that is very similar to con-
temporary common law traditions. Lawrence Rosen stated that
"[i]n the course of studying Islamic law in its everyday practice I
have been increasingly struck with its similarities to the common
law form in which I have also been trained in the United
States.23
Misunderstandings regarding this common law feature of Is-
lamic transactions law have caused significant problems in re-
cently Islamized States:
[I] n Pakistan and the Sudan the simple use of Islamic law as
21. MUHAMMAD TAQI UsMANI, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC FINANCE 237 (1988)
[hereinafter USMANI].
22. MUHAMMAD IBN IDRIS AL-SHAF'l, AL-RisALAH 477 (Majid Khadduri trans., 2d ed.,
The Islamic Texts Society 1969) (1939).
23. LAWRENCE ROSEN, THEJUSTICE OF IsLAM 39 (2000).
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an arm of the [S] tate has slipped through the fingers of those
at the center. The reason, I believe, is that these regimes have
been trying to apply a common law variant as if it were a civil
law system. 24
Thus, while Islamic jurisprudence has in fact evolved as a
common law system, the rhetoric of opinions utilized by jurists
suggests a civil/canon law procedure of interpreting legal texts.
I shall now illustrate this tension through an analysis of a fatwa
issued by the Azhar's Islamic Research Institute in December
2002 and the reaction it has elicited. Of particular interest is the
fact that both the text of the fatwa (and its supporting argu-
ments in other sources), and the rejection by the IJAjurists on
the other, each focus on the canonical nature of the law, even
when the application of a particular text to the practical issue at
hand is very far-fetched.
3. The Azhar Islamic Research Institute Fatwa (December 2002)
The second and penultimate paragraphs of the A1-Azhar
fatwa25 hinted at the common objection to fixing profits in the
Islamic silent partnership contract [mudarabah] .26 As we shall
see below, jurists often claim that there is a consensus that the
principal's profit share must be specified as a percentage of total
profits, rather than a fixed percentage of the capital. The text of
the fatwa hints at the view that this opinion was only an artifact
of the historical thought of Islamic jurists who developed the
principle and does not rely on any direct injunction in canonical
Islamic texts.
Elsewhere, Tantawi elaborated on the fatwa's justification of
fixing the profit share as a percentage of the partnership's capi-
tal on moral hazard considerations. In his book, Tantawi stated
that "non-fixity of profits [as a percentage of capital] in this age
of corruption, dishonesty and greed would put the principal
under the mercy of the agent investing the funds, be it a bank or
24. Id. at 64.
25. See infra Appendix A, Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, Rector of A1-Azhar Islamic
Research Institute, Fatwa, Investing Funds with Banks that Pre-Specify Profits. I am grateful
to Dr. Anas Al-Zarqa for sharing a scanned version of the official fatwa. The official
fatwa (in Arabic) is reproduced in the Appendix since the author has received many
requests by email from readers who wished to read the Arabic original and study its
specific wording. An English translation of its full text follows it.
26. See infra Appendix B at Section D.
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otherwise. 2 7  Tantawi also cited similar opinions by highly
respected earlier jurists, including Abdul-Wahhab Khallaf,28 Ali
AI-Khafif,29 and others."° One of the most notable statements is
the following:
When one gives his money to another for investment and pay-
ment of a known profit, this does not constitute the defini-
tively forbidden iba, regardless of the pre-specified profit
rate. This follows from the fact that disagreeing with the ju-
ristic rule that forbids pre-specification of profits does not
constitute the clear type of Yiba which ruins households. This
type of transaction is beneficial both to the investor and the
entrepreneur. In contrast, riba harms one for no fault other
than being in need, and benefits another for no reason ex-
cept greed and hardness of heart. The two types of dealings
cannot possibly have the same legal status (Hukm). '
The juristic condition for validity of mudaraba[h], that profits
are not pre-specified is a condition without proof (dalil). Just
as profits may be shared between the two parties, the profits
of one party may be pre-specified. Such a condition may disa-
gree with jurists' opinions, but it does not contradict any Ca-
nonical Text in the Qur'an or Sunnah. 2
The only objection for this dealing is the condition of validity
of mudaraba[h], that profits must be specified as percentage
shares, rather than specified amounts or percentages of capi-
tal. I reply to this objection in the following manner: fJlirst,
this condition has no proof (dalil) from the Qur'an and Sun-
nah. Silent partnerships follow the conditions stipulated by
the partners. We now live in a time of great dishonesty, and if
we do not specify a fixed profit for the investor, his partner
27. MUHAMMAD SAYVID TANTAWI, MU'AMALAT AL-BUNUK wA-AHKAMUHA AL-SHAR'IYAH
131 (Nahdat Misr. 2001) [hereinafter TANTAWI].
28. See id. at 94-104.
29. See id. at 165-204.
30. See id. at 204-11.
31. Id. at 95. This quotation was attributed to Abdul-Wahhah Khallafs two articles
on riba, in LIWA' AL-'IsLAM, Vol. 4 (1951), who in turn attributed these statements to
Rashid Rida's article, in 9 AL MANAR 332 (1906), which quoted Ustadh Muhammad
Abduh. Similar arguments were made by Rashid Rida, Ma 'ruf A1-Dawalibi and Abdul-
Razzaq Al-Sanhuri in various forms. Their arguments were based, respectively, on re-
stricting the strict Qur'anic prohibition to post hoc charging of interest, charging inter-
est on consumption (as opposed to production) loans, and charging compound inter-
est. The current opinion of Tantawi is quite different, in that it takes the issue away
from one of interest-bearing loans to one of investment with pre-specified profits.
32. TANTAWi, supra note 27, at 95-96. This quotation was attributed to Abdul-Wah-
hab Khallaf's two articles on iba, in 4 LIwA' AL-'IsLAM, (1951), at 11.
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will devour his wealth. Second, if the mudaraba[h] is deemed
defective due to violation of one of its conditions, the entre-
preneur becomes a hired worker. Thus, what he takes is con-
sidered wages. Let that be as it may, for there is no difference
in calling it a mudaraba[h][h] or an ijara: It is a valid transac-
tion that benefits the investor who cannot directly invest his
funds, and benefits the entrepreneur who gets capital with
which to work. Thus, it is a transaction that benefits both par-
ties, without harming either party or anyone else. Forbidding
this beneficial transaction would result in harm, and the
Prophet (P) forbade that by saying: "No harm is allowed. 33
We now note again that this fatwa is focused on the liabili-
ties side of banking, and even then addresses the issue from the
point of view of depositors. Indeed, Tantawi argued that the de-
positor/bank relationship should neither be viewed as one of de-
positor/depositary nor lender/borrower. He admits that either
characterization of the relationship would render any interest
payment a form of forbidden riba. In contrast, he argued, that
savers take their funds to banks to invest on their behalf. There-
fore, the relationship is one of principal and agent in an invest-
ment agency, and the juristic problem discussed above only re-
lates to the permissibility of fixing profits as a percentage of capi-
tal in such an investment agency. As we shall see shortly, the
rebuttal, representing the views of mostjurists around the world,
insists that the relationship is initially one of deposit. Once the
depositary uses the funds deposited therein, classical jurispru-
dence suggests that the depositary has thus violated the simple
safekeeping duties of a fiduciary deposit and must thus guaran-
tee the funds for the depositor. The deposit contract is one of
trust rather than guaranty. For example, the depositary only
guarantees funds against its own negligence and transgression,
not unconditionally. Therefore, the classical juristic argument
concludes that the contract can no longer be viewed as a deposit
and must be viewed as a loan, the latter being a contract of guar-
anty. Indeed, Tantawi devotes much of his arguments to stating
that deposits at banks do not fit the classical jurisprudential defi-
nition of "deposits" [wadi'ah] and rejecting their characteriza-
tion as loans. 4
33. TANTAWI, supra note 27. This quotation was attributed to Abdul-WAahhah Khal-
laf's two articles on riba, in LIWA' AL-'Ist.AM, Vol. 4 (1951), at 12.
34. See generally TANTAW1, supra note 27.
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4. Rebuttal by the Islamic Fiqh Institute in Qatar (January 2003)
In the conclusions of the Fourteenth Session of Majlis
Majma' Al-Fiqh Al- Islami35 in Duha, Qatar on January 11-16,
2003, the Azhar IRI's characterization of dealings with conven-
tional banks as a legitimate investment vehicle was rejected. This
opinion contains four main arguments against the correctness
and relevance of the IRI fatwa:
1. The fatwa refers to banks with permissible investments,
but banks are forbidden from investing in any instru-
ments other than interest-bearing loans and financial in-
struments.
2. Characterizing the depositor/bank relationship as one of
investment agency is incorrect. The correct classical
characterization is one of lender/borrower.
3. There is a consensus that all forms of bank interest are
forbidden iba.
4. Even if the relationship was to be considered an invest-
ment agency (silent partnership), pre-specification of
profits in such partnerships must be in terms of a per-
centage of total profits, not a percentage of capital. The
moral hazard argument is ignored and the principle of
return being justified by risk is highlighted.
The first point is clearly valid. One can easily see that by
focusing on the liabilities side of banking, the IRI fatwa, and its
predecessors ignored the nature of bank assets, which are legally
interest-bearing loans and forbidden by all jurists as a form of
riba. This renders the IRI fatwa irrelevant for conventional
banks, wherein investments are deemed impermissible.
On the other hand, as we shall see in Section 6 and noted in
the Introduction's quote by Saleh Kamel, Islamic financial insti-
tutions have managed to find permissible alternatives to bank
loans that are functionally equivalent to interest-bearing loans.36
On the other hand, "depositors" at those institutions are not en-
titled to any rate of return and "investment account" holders are
exposed to unnecessary levels of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion due to their exposure to losses. This problem has been
35. See infra Appendix B, Majlis al Fiqh Al-Islami [Islamic Jurisprudence Council]
14th Sess., Dec. 133(7/14) 20-24 (2003). A lengthy quotation from the official conclu-
sions of the meeting summarizes the contemporary overwhelming majority view on con-
ventional banking among jurists and appears in Appendix B.
36. See Kamel, supra note 3.
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practically solved in Islamic finance by selling shares in closed-
end "murabahah funds," essentially securitized claims to the
stream of fixed payments of principal, plus interest (mark-up),
in which the only source of risk is default risk (as in the case of
interest-bearing loans). While this solution provides some of the
banking functions of pooling the resources of many savers and
diversifying the portfolio by financing multiple projects/
purchases, it falls short of addressing all the prudential regula-
tion standards to which banks are subjected.
I shall return to those issues in the Conclusion, where I ar-
gue that the combination of lax opinions that Islamic bank ju-
rists have adopted and the IRI opinion on pre-specification of
profits as a percentage of capital can provide a coherent frame-
work for Islamic financial intermediation. Furthermore, this ad-
aptation can reduce current agency costs in the industry. Before
turning to that issue, however, we need to briefly review the
background and practice of Islamic finance.
5. Ideological Roots of Islamic Finance: Islamic Economics
Islamic finance was conceived in the 1970s as the brain-child
of contemporary "Islamic economics." The latter began to take
shape in the 1950s, based primarily on the writings of Muham-
mad Iqbal and Abu Al-A'la A1-Maududi, from India and Pakistan
respectively, and Baqir A1-Sadr and Sayyid Qutb, from the Arab
world. 7 Timur Kuran noted the importance of the concurrent
emergence of a political independence movement to Islamic fi-
nance, with its accompanying emphasis on national and relig-
ious identities. He argued convincingly that it was this ideol-
ogy that gave rise to Islamic economics, which was still socio-po-
litically (and not scientifically) based on religion.
Over the course of three decades, Islamic economics
morphed into a sub-field of economics as suggested by contem-
porary leaders of the field:
Islamic economics ... has the advantage of benefiting from
37. See generally MOHAMED ASLAM HANEEF, CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC ECONOMIC
THOUGHT: A SELECTED COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (1995) (summarizing early Islamic eco-
nomics writers' views and contributions to field).
38. See Timur Kuran, The Discontents of Islamic Economic Morality, 86 Am. ECON. REv.
438, 438-42 (1996); Timur Kuran, The Genesis of Islamic Economics: A Chapter in the Politics
of Islamic Identity, 64 Soc. REs. 301, 301-39 (1997); Timur Kuran, Islamic Economics and
the Islamic Subeconomy, 9J. ECON. PERSP. 155, 155-73 (1995).
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the tools of analysis developed by conventional economics.
These tools, along with a consistent world-view for both
microeconomics and macroeconomics, and empirical data
about the extent of deviation from [normative] goal realiza-
tion, may help .... "
[Islamic economics] is the Muslim thinkers' response to the
economic challenges of their times. In this endeavor they
were aided by the Qur'an and the Sunnah as well as by reason
and experience. 4
0
Therefore, while Islamic economics was initially conceived as an
independent Islamic social science, it quickly lost that emphasis
on independence and identity. "[Islamic economics] failed to
escape the centripetal pull of Western economic thought, and
has in many regards been caught in the intellectual web of the
very system it set out to replace. '"'
Similarly to the convergence of Islamic economics with
mainstream economic thought, Islamic finance quickly turned
to mimicking the interest-based conventional finance it initially
set out to replace. However, writings in Islamic jurisprudence,
economics, and finance continued to assert that conventional in-
terest-based banking and finance were forbidden iba. Thus,
popular Islamic discourse continues to refer to conventional
banks as "ribawi banks, '4 2 and to assert that the Islamic alterna-
tive is "interest-free." It is this divergence between the fiction of
39. Mohammad U. Chapra, Expanded Version of Lecture Delivered at the Islamic
Development Bank in Jeddah (Oct. 29, 1990), in MOHAMMAD U. CHAPRA, WHAT IS Is-
LAMIC ECONOMICS? 53-54 (1996).
40. Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, Lectures on Islamic Economics, in LECTURES ON
ISLAMIC ECONOMICS: PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS OF AN INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON
"TEACHING ISLAMIC ECONOMICS OF UNIVERSITY TEACHERS" 69 (Ausaf Ahmad & Kazim
Raza Awan eds., 1992).
41. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Islamization of Knowledge: A Critical Overview, 30 ISLAMIC
STUD. 387, 388 (1991).
42. See generally MUHAMMAD BAQIR SADR, AL-BANK AL-A-RIBAWI FI AL-ISLAM [THE No-
RIBA BANK IN ISLAM] (Dar al-Ta'aruf lil-Matbu'at 1978) (drawing early distinctions be-
tween conventional banks and perceived Islamic counterparts); MUHAMMAD BAQIR
SADR, IQTISADUNA [OUR ECONOMICS] (Matabi' al-Nu'man 1961). See also, MUHAMMAD
NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI, ISSUES IN ISLAMIC BANKING: SELECTED PAPERS (1983); MUHAMMAD
NEJATULLAH SIDDIQI, BANKING WITHOUT INTEREST (1983) (illustrating early vision of Is-
lamic banking); Mohammed Uzair, An Outline of Interestless Banking (Karachi and Dacca:
Rehan Publications 1955) (gaining attribution as earliest similar view on Islamic bank-
ing); cf FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES, ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK
AND RETURN 139 (1998) [hereinafter VOGEL & HAYES]; MERVYN K. LEWIS & LATIFA M.
ALGAOUD, ISLAMIC BANKING 40 (2001).
124 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:108
Islamic finance and its reality that gave rise to the paradox ad-
dressed in this Article.
At its inception, Islamic banking was theoretically conceived
on the principle of profit and loss-sharing through a two-tier si-
lent partnership (mudarabah), in place of the ribawi, deposit/
loan-based commercial banking system. Providers of funds
would be viewed as principals/silent-partners extending their
funds to an Islamic bank, viewed as an entrepreneur or invest-
ment agent. The Islamic bank would thus invest funds on the
principals' behalf in exchange for a share in profits. If invest-
ments were not profitable, the bank/agent would lose only its
effort, and the principals would bear all financial losses. In turn,
the bank would invest the funds by acting as a principal in other
investment agency contracts (silent partnerships) with its various
customers.
This two-tiered, profit-sharing form of financial intermedia-
tion, which was potentially supplemented with legal stratagems
[hiyal] in order to fix profits as a percentage of capital was hardly
new. Indeed, Avram Udovich dubs this practice, used in medie-
val Mediterranean trade as "bankers without banks."43 The basic
profit-sharing principle also bears a very close resemblance to
the Jewish legal concept of the heter isqa [partnership clause]
contract; a silent partnership profit-sharing arrangement used to
avoid the Biblical prohibition of ribit.44 Like heter isqa docu-
ments,4 5 Islamic bank documents avoid the use of any terms that
may result in a charge of violating the prohibition of iba, such as
"loan," "interest," "borrower," "lender," etc..46
Later refinements of the heter isqa allowed profits received
by the principal to be a fixed percentage of the partnership's
43. See Avram Udovich, Bankers without Banks: Commerce, Banking and Society
in the Islamic World of the Middle Ages (1981) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
44. Cf. Joseph Stern, Ribit: A Halachic Anthology, at http://www.jlaw.com/Articles/
ribisl.html (understanding ribis' common meaning with Jewish law as prohibiting
charging interest on loans to fellow Jews).
45. See generally Forms, Journal of Halachic and Contemporary Society, at http://
www.jlaw.com/Forms/iska-d.html (spelling heter iska with "K" instead of "Q").
46. In an interesting fatwa for HSBC Amana Finance in New York, two active Is-
lamic bank jurists signed a document that stated that such language (including the
terms "borrower," "interest," and "loan," etc.) was only mandated in HSBC documents
by New York State, but further noted that the contract was nonetheless essentially inter-
est-free.
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capital, as a solution to the inherent moral hazard of silent part-
nerships. The fundamental argument underlying the December
2002 ruling of A1-Azhar's Islamic Research Institute revolves
around the same issue of fixing the silent-partner's profit per-
centage to solve moral hazard problems. However, this attempt
to justify interest as a fixed profit rate in an investment relation-
ship has been met with violent opposition by the Islamic juristic
community. The paradox, however, is that this same community
has been supportive of an Islamic finance movement that is, at
best, an economically inefficient replication of the conventional
finance for which it purports to be a substitute.
6. The Paradox of Contemporary Islamic Finance
Scanning any news article on Islamic finance, one is almost
certain to read that "Muslims are forbidden to pay or receive
interest."47 On the other hand, one need not read much further
before facing our paradox. For instance, in a recent FORTUNE
magazine article dealing with Islamic auto-finance, the author
cited a case study wherein a customer of one Islamic bank chose
a car that he wished to purchase on credit and negotiated its
price with the dealer. The customer then asked the Islamic bank
to purchase the car at its cash price from the dealer and then to
sell it to him on credit. The credit prices charged by Islamic
banks include a pre-specified profit-margin (mark-up) that paral-
lels the market interest rates for auto loans with similar charac-
teristics. Reflecting on the transaction, the author of the article
exclaimed that the "result looked a lot like interest, and some
argue that murabahah is simply a thinly veiled version of it; the
mark-up [bank's name] charges is very close to the prevailing
interest rate. But bank officials argue that God is in the de-
tails."48 The bulk of Islamic finance operations today involve this
type of mark-up credit sales, or more sophisticated lease-to-
purchase transactions with similar built-in mark-ups designated
47. Interestingly, English versions of the Qur'an frequently translated riba as
"usury." With the advent of Islamic economics, translations substituted "interest" for
usury" and riba. Mahmoud El-Gamal, An Economic Explication of the Prohibition of Riba in
Classical Islamic Jurisprudence, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD HARVARD UNIVERSITY FORUM
ON ISLAMIC FINANCE (Harv. Islamic Fin. Info. Program et al. eds., 2001) (comparing and
contrasting concepts of iba, "usury," and "interest").
48. J. Useem, Banking on Allah, FORTUNE, June 10, 2002 (illustrating that cynical
"God is in the details" is particularly distasteful in light of formalistic "details" docu-
mented later in this Section).
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as rent. Moreover, the mark-up is explicitly based on a market
interest rate such as LIBOR, and jurists have defended this prac-
tice on the basis of LIBOR serving "only as a benchmark."
The same paradox can also be observed at the
macroeconomic level. In June 2002, Bank Negara Malaysia is-
sued US $500 million in "global sukuk," described as an "Islamic
treasury bond," which operates on "Islamic interest-free financial
and investment principles."49 The current Islamic bond market
in Malaysia is estimated to be worth US$20 billion.50 In August
2002, the Bahrain Monetary Agency announced its third issu-
ance of Islamic leasing sukuk worth US$80 million and paying a
"four percent annual profit. 51  Thus, such news articles para-
doxically report on "interest-free" financial instruments and
shortly proceed to report their interest rate. Calling such instru-
ments "interest-free" is particularly problematic in light of at-
tached government guarantees. Bahrain's Islamic leasing sukuk
issue of US$80 million in August 2002, which was 2.1 times over-
subscribed was declared (along with earlier issues in September
2001) to be ". . . directly and unconditionally guaranteed by the
government."
5 2
Islamic banks have kept to the generally accepted principle
of profit and loss-sharing on their liabilities side, at least in prin-
49. The singular of sukuk is bakk, meaning a written documentation of financial
liability. Most historians maintain that the Arabic term bakk is the root of the French/
English cheque or "check." See generally MUHAMMAD IBN MUKARRAM IBN MANZUR, LISAN
AL-'ARAB (1992); see also MUHAMMAD RAwwAS QAL'AH'JI ET AL., MU'JAM LUGHAT AL
-FUQAHA (1996). Indeed, one of the most popular English-Arabic dictionaries trans-
lates the English word "bond" as both sanad (the conventional Arabic word for govern-
ment and corporate bonds and its plural form: sanadat) and sakk. Cf MUNIr BA'ALBAKI
& RUTH BA'ALBAKI, AL-MAWRID (1998). Earlier attempts to provide bond alternatives
through jurist-approved issues profit-sharing alternatives in Jordan and Turkey were
limited in success and scope due to the principal not being guaranteed. Cf VOGEL &
HAYES, supra note 42, at 169-70, 191-93. Pakistani "participation certificates" and earlier
experiments in Malaysia with "government investment certificates" (in which the princi-
pal was guaranteed) failed to gain acceptance among jurists in other countries, espe-
cially within the Arab world. See generally Mahmoud EI-Gamal, Involving Islamic Banks in
Central Bank Open Market Operations, 41 THUNDERBIRD INT'L BUS. REV., Nos. 4, 5, at 501-
21 (1999).
50. See Mushtak Parker, Unique Islamic Treasury Bond Launched, ARAB NEWS, July 8,
2002, available at http://www.arabnews.com/?page=6&section=0&article=16700&d=8&
m=7&y=2002.
51. See Claire Innes, Bahrain-Government Issues Islamic Bonds, WMRC DAILY ANALYSIS,
Aug. 13, 2002.
52. See Indira Chand, Islamic Leasing Bonds are Oversubscribed by 210pc, GULF DAILY
NEWS, Aug. 28, 2002.
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ciple if not in practice. Thus, depositors in Islamic banks do not
earn any return on their deposits while those holding "invest-
ment accounts" earn a share of the profits and are exposed to
potential losses. In practice, Islamic banks use special accounts
to smooth the profit distribution to their investment account
holders (thus keeping profit distributions close to market inter-
est rates).53
On the assets side, Islamic banks avoid the risks of profit
and loss-sharing investment arrangements by engaging mostly in
cost-plus trading and lease financing. As noted by Saleh Kamel
in the introductory quotes, both forms of finance mimic conven-
tional bank financing to a very high degree, with few technical
details. One of the most active jurists in the area of Islamic fi-
nance is Justice Muhammad Taqi Usmani, who has served on
numerous Shari'ah boards of Islamic banks. He summarized the
generally reluctant attitude of toleration towards cost-plus fi-
nancing as follows:
Murabahah is not a mode of financing in its origin. It is a sim-
ple sale on cost-plus basis. However, after adding the concept
of deferred payment, it has been devised to be used as a
mode of financing only in cases where the client intends to
purchase a commodity. Therefore, it should neither be taken
as an ideal Islamic mode of financing, nor a universal instru-
ment for all sorts of financing. It should be taken as a transi-
tory step towards the ideal Islamic system of financing based
on musharakah or mudarabah. Otherwise its use should be re-
stricted to areas where musharakah or mudarabah cannot
work.54
Nostalgic references to the ideological roots of Islamic finance
aside, Usmani explains the formalist legalistic nature of the dis-
tinction between interest-based loan financing and cost-plus-
based financing as practiced by Islamic banks in the following
passage:
If in cases of genuine need, the financier appoints the client
his agent to purchase the commodity on his behalf, his differ-
53. Cf Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions,
Accounting, Auditing and Governance Standards for Islamic Financial Institutions:
The Full Text of Accounting, Auditing and Governance Standards for Islamic Financial
Institutions as at Safar 142H-June 2000 (Accounting and Auditing Organization for Is-
lamic Financial Institutions ed., 2000) [hereinafter AAOIFI].
54. USMANI, supra note 21, at 151.
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ent capacities (i.e., as agent and as ultimate purchaser)
should be clearly distinguished. As an agent, he is a trustee
.... After he purchases the commodity in his capacity as
agent, he must inform the financier that, in fulfilling his obli-
gation as his agent, he has taken delivery of the purchased
commodity and now he extends his offer to purchase it from
him. When, in response to this offer, the financier conveys
his acceptance to this offer, the sale will be deemed to be
complete, and the risk of the property will be passed on to
the client as purchaser. At this point he will become a debtor
55
Justice Usmani's conclusion of this long passage highlights
the unease with which this mode of financing has been widely
adopted in Islamic finance:
It should be noted with care that murabahah is a border-line
transaction and a slight departure from the prescribed proce-
dure makes it step on the prohibited area of interest-based
financing. Therefore, this transaction must be carried out
with due diligence and no requirement of Shari'ah should be
taken lightly.56
However, the same formulaic development is maintained in the
official murabahah formula endorsed by the Accounting and Au-
diting Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions. 57 If Is-
lamic bank jurists declare certain transactions to be permissible,
it seems at best naive, and at worst disingenuous, to call for re-
stricting the use of those instruments. A more realistic approach
would be to conclude that Islamic transactional products differ
from their conventional counterparts in the same manner that
kosher water bottles differ from most other bottled water- certi-
fication by certain religious figures.
Coming under attack as mere window dressing for conven-
tional bank interest-based financing, Islamic banks shifted some
of their assets from murabahah (cost-plus sale) modes to ijara
[lease] financing modes. In cost-plus sale financing, the fixed
rate of return earned by the Islamic bank was designated as a
mark-up of the deferred price over the spot price of the financed
property. In lease financing, the fixed rate of return is desig-
nated as rental payment for the underlying property. Hence,
55. Id. at 152.
56. Id. at 153.
57. See AAOIFI, supra note 53.
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the property must have a legitimate usufruct, which is an easy
requirement to meet for financing real estate, auto, and equip-
ment purchases. 5' Needless to say, the rent component of lease
financing is used by Islamic banks to mimic market interest
rates. Again, the formalist-legalistic approach to this issue is evi-
dent from Justice Usmani's discussion of the matter:
• .. [T]hese contracts use the interest rate of a particular
country (like LIBOR) as a benchmark for determining the
periodical increase in the rent.
This arrangement has been criticized on two grounds:
The first objection raised against it is that, by subjecting the
rental payments to the rate of interest, the transaction is ren-
dered akin to an interest based financing. This objection can
be overcome by saying that, as fully discussed in the case of
murabahah, the rate of interest is used as a benchmark only.5 9
In both Islamic cost-plus and lease financing, the distinction
jurists make is that the Islamic bank bears the direct risk associ-
ated with the financed property. Islamic banks bear the risk
throughout the life of the lease in the case of leasing, and during
the period between purchasing the property and reselling it to
the customer in the case of cost-plus financing. Thus, jurists can
accommodate (with unease) those fixed rate-of-return forms of
finance, while maintaining the prohibition of conventional inter-
est-based financing. Traditionally, their argument rested on two
main distinctions. First, a physical asset that is the subject of fi-
nancing must exist. In the case of lease financing, that asset
must be sufficiently durable, and must have legitimate usufruct.
Thus, many jurists affirmed in the past that Islamic finance is
"asset-based" or that it is based on "money-for-assets" exchanges
as opposed to the supposed "money-for-money" nature of con-
ventional finance. Second, the financier must bear risks associ-
ated with this asset for some period of time, thus justifying a rate
of return on the basis of this risk exposure.
The first distinction is easily rendered vacuous. Some Is-
lamic banks (e.g., the Kuwait Finance House) have long engaged
in the transaction known as tawarruq [literally "monetization"] in
58. Surprisingly, however, education loan alternatives were recently proposed on
the basis of lease financing, "education" being seen as the usufruct of a college or uni-
versity. It is not yet clear how well this innovation will be received.
59. USMANI, supra note 21, at 169.
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order to accommodate their large customers' liquidity needs.
They would identify a commodity (asset) with stable historical
price behavior, buy the commodity from a third party at its spot
price, sell it to the customer at a higher deferred price, and the
customer would then sell the commodity to the third party (or
any other) at the spot price. The net result is that the customer
receives the needed cash immediately and has a debt to pay the
larger deferred price to the bank. This three-way exchange by-
passes the two-party sale resale procedure known as bay'al-'ina,
and forbidden explicitly in a prophetic tradition. Tawarruq is
permitted by a minority opinion in the Hanbali school. Recently,
the National Commercial Bank in Saudi Arabia and A1-Shamil
Bank in Bahrain offered tawarruq-based consumer loans under
the names of al-taysir and tamwil al-shamil, respectively. Conse-
quently, the "asset-based" distinction seems inconsequential.
The second distinction listed above addresses the risk or
guarantee/daman issues that played a central role in classical Is-
lamic jurisprudence. It does so in a trivializing and highly for-
mulaic manner.6" Consider for instance a cost-plus financing ar-
rangement wherein the customer is appointed as purchasing
agent for the Islamic bank as described by Usmani. The actual
time period during which the bank is exposed to ownership-risk
can be made infinitesimal while the fixed rate of return for ex-
tending credit to the customer is set equal to the market-deter-
mined price of credit (interest rate). The credit-risk component
of the financing is infinitely more important than the formulaic
risk borne from the time the agent purchases the item on behalf
of the bank until he sells it to himself, also on behalf of the bank.
However, as we have seen from Usmani's statement above, it is
the latter risk that distinguishes between Islamic and conven-
tional finance.
Beginning in the late 1980's, Islamic finance moved beyond
the simple Islamic banking model of paying investment account
60. Despite thousands of references to the legal maxim, al-kharaju bi-l-daman (re-
turn must be justified by guaranty/risk], in the Islamic Jurisprudence and Finance liter-
ature, I have yet to read a single satisfactory explanation of what it means. If we include
credit risk in the formula, then the statement is merely tautological, saying basically that
there is no arbitrage opportunity (or free lunch). If we insist that daman must refer to
commodity or asset risk, then we are inviting the legal stratagems described in this
section. In either case, it is difficult to understand the substance of this oft quoted
maxim.
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holders a variable profit or loss share (which nonetheless tended
to mimic market interest on deposits). This procedure does re-
main the core business of Islamic banks, but deposit alternatives
have ceased to be an important source of funds for the latter.
With the advent of securitization technology in the mid-1980s,
market-oriented Islamic finance models were quickly devised. In
devising "Shari'ah arbitrage" or methods resembling the regula-
tory arbitrage methods of contemporary structured finance, "Is-
lamic financial engineers" marketed securitized products to
Shari'ah scholars as legitimate investments in physical assets,
thus entitling owners to collect rent. Simultaneously, the actual
legal structures employed by this movement in structured Is-
lamic finance had to meet local (e.g., American or British) regu-
lators' requirements, which often render the security a mere
claim to the accounts receivable. Thus, a bankruptcy-remote
Special Purpose Vehicle ("SPV") or Entity ("SPE") is created and
Islamic investors may buy shares. The SPV may be a subsidiary of
a conventional bank, receiving a credit line from the bank, for
which it pays conventional interest. The SPV's role is to insulate
the Muslim investor, through a single degree of separation, from
the interest-bearing debt transaction. Islamic finance jurists
have concluded that the most important matters for juristic pur-
poses are the relationship between Muslim investors and the fi-
nancial provider, regardless of the source of funds and the pro-
vider's other transactions. Needless to say, this has created a lu-
crative structured Islamic finance industry, wherein Shari'ah
arbitrage profits can be collected in various forms by banks, law-
yers, and jurists.
The one degree of separation principle of contemporary Is-
lamic finance allows conventional banks and other banks to use
conventional banking funds and provide "Islamic" products that
cost the same as conventional ones. In some cases, banks may
securitize the latter to provide investors with a fixed rate of re-
turn as an alternative to banking interest. The ability of conven-
tional financial providers to market essentially conventional
products as Islamic was summarized very clearly in an informa-
tional release from HSBC following its launch of an Islamic fi-
nance program. 61
61. See infra Appendix C, HSBC Launches Islamic Vehicle Finance - Frequently Asked
Questions, available at www.zawya.com (Feb. 3, 2003) (publishing "frequently asked ques-
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Together with the one degree of separation principle,
Shari'ah arbitrage requires a dual characterization of simple
debt-finance structures to jurists and regulators to simultane-
ously obtain: (i) approval from regulators that the proposed
transaction falls within the broad categories of conventional fi-
nance, and (ii) approval from jurists and the Muslim public that
the proposed transaction is Islamic in nature, in the sense of be-
ing similar to medieval transactions described in classical books
of Islamic jurisprudence. Accordingly, the U.S. Treasury Depart-
ment's Office of the Controller of the Currency (which regulates
all national banks in the U.S.) issued two letters of understand-
ing on murabahah and ijara financing as practiced by Islamic
banks (attention was initially paid to those contracts as practiced
by United Bank of Kuwait in New York):
OCC #867, 1999: . . . lending takes many forms . . .
[M]urabahah financing proposals are functionally equivalent
to or a logical outgrowth of secured real estate lending and
inventory and equipment financing, activities that are part of
the business of banking.62
OCC #806, 1997: Today, banks structure leases so that they
are equivalent to lending secured by private property . . .a
lease that has the economic attributes of a loan is within the
business of banking .... Here it is clear that United Bank of
Kuwait's net lease is functionally equivalent to a financing
transaction in which the Branch occupies the position of a
secured lender ....6
This allows "Islamic finance" providers to replace interest
bearing loans on the asset side of their balance sheets with
murabahah or ijara-based contracts which can be conjoined with
other investment or commissioned to manufacture contracts.
On the liabilities side, Islamic finance providers need to replace
paying interest on loans and money market instruments with an
Islamic securitization fiction. For instance, jurists profess that
tions" release on Internet in Islamic Finance). The webpage constitutes a very thor-
ough, though perhaps unintentional, admission of the "one degree of separation" prin-
ciple as I described it in the preceding paragraphs.
62. Letter of Understanding on Murabaha, U.S. Treasury Department's Office of
the Controller of the Currency, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/nov99/int
867.pdf.
63. Letter of Understanding on Ijara, U.S. Treasury Department's Office of the
Controller of the Currency, available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/dec97/int806.
pdf.
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there is a fundamental difference between an Islamic securitized
lease and an interest-bearing instrument by viewing the inves-
tors' interest as direct ownership of the underlying asset:
It should be remembered, however, that the [lease] certifi-
cate must represent ownership of an undivided part of the
asset with all its rights and obligations. Misunderstanding this
basic concept, some quarters tried to issue ijarah certificates
representing the holder's right to claim certain amount of
rental only without assigning him any kind of ownership in
the asset. . . . This type of securitization is not allowed in
Shari'ah.6 4
In Islamic equity investment, a similar fiction is required for
the marketing of Islamic mutual funds. Jurists have long main-
tained that ownership of common stocks in companies that en-
gage in permissible activities is permissible, provided that the
companies do not earn or pay substantial amounts of interest.
This led to the creation of a universe of listed company stocks
that qualify as "Shari'ah compliant." The screening criteria im-
posed by the DowJones Islamic Index ("DJII") have gained near-
universal acceptance. Those screening criteria exclude compa-
nies whose primary business is unacceptable,65 companies with
debt-to-market-capitalization ratios greater than one-third, and
companies with accounts receivable exceeding forty-five percent
of total assets. In addition, many screens put a limit on the inter-
est income to total income, usually in the five to ten percent
range. Islamic mutual funds usually start with the Islamic equity
universe created by the DJII or similar set of screens, and then
apply standard portfolio management criteria for creating mu-
tual funds. Similar to their understanding of securitized leases,
many jurists who are active in this field surprisingly continue to
view ownership of shares in such mutual funds as direct owner-
ship of the underlying assets (common shares) and allow owner-
ship thereof based on that understanding.66
64. USMANI, supra note 21 at 179.
65. These include so-called sin industries such as breweries, tobacco, etc., as well as
a number of other industries deemed un-Islamic.
66. The point of securitization is that the security is a share in the Special Purpose
Vehicle ("SPV") or Mutual Fund, not the underlying assets themselves (e.g., real estate
properties or publicly traded company shares). I am not aware of any court cases re-
garding the legitimacy of claims of pass-through-ownership of underlying assets. In the
meantime, it seems clear that Islamic debt instruments (e.g., lease-backed securities
sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as well as those placed privately in GCC countries
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In summary, Islamic finance has thrived based on Shari'ah
arbitrage by creating an environment wherein jurists on the in-
dustry's payroll denounce conventional financial products as
subjects of the severest prohibition in Islam while facilitating the
creation of twin-products. This is accomplished through the two
factors allowing for Shari'ah arbitrage: (i) the one degree of
separation principle, and (ii) juristic fiction about the nature of
structured Islamic finance products. In the meantime, tradi-
tional Islamic banks are forced to continue to deal with their
investment account holders' on a profit/loss-sharing basis.
CONCLUDING REMARKS: A COMPROMISE RESOLUTION?
We now return to the main topic of this paper - interest.
We have seen that the fatwa of the IRI does not apply to conven-
tional banks, as long as the latter continue to accumulate assets
in the form of interest-bearing loans. On the other hand, the
principal point of the fatwa - allowing for pre-specified profits
as a percentage of capital in investment agency contracts - can
apply, rather naturally, to the framework of Islamic banking.
We have seen in the previous section that Islamic banks in-
vest most of their funds in fixed-interest cost-plus and lease fi-
nancing, thus nearly perfectly mimicking the assets side of con-
ventional banks, as admitted in the opening quote by Saleh
Kamel. On the other hand, Islamic banks have not been able to
mimic conventional banks' interest-bearing deposit accounts, in-
sisting instead on the profit/loss-sharing formula for investment
account holders. This has led to the securitization-based
Shari'ah arbitrage opportunities discussed in the previous sec-
tion which allow Islamic financial institutions to pay disguised
interest to providers of funds who are characterized as buyers of
lease certificates, murabahah fund shares, etc.. Needless to say,
this is an inefficient solution due to the additional legal costs
and fees paid to Islamic bank jurists that ultimately produce ap-
proximations of conventional products at a higher cost.
In the meantime, investment account holders in Islamic
by specialized Islamic finance outfits) are virtually identical to interest-bearing debt in-
struments. In theory, there may be some differences in risk allocation between Islamic
instruments and their conventional counterparts. However, until cases are brought to
test possible discrepancies between the juristic and the regulatory understandings of
Islamic finance instruments, it is difficult to say whether those differences are substan-
Live.
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banks are exposed to significantly higher agency costs than their
counterparts (depositors) in conventional banks. This is the
case since Islamic bank investment account-holders lack the pro-
tection of being primary claimants as creditors of the bank and
lack protection from moral hazard through representation on
the board of directors of the bank. The latter represent the rela-
tively wealthier owners of the Islamic bank, who in essence own a
call option on the bank's portfolio. In this regard, investment
account-holders absorb some of the portfolio risk and give the
bank owners and management that answers to them an incentive
to take even greater risks. This is clearly an unacceptable situa-
tion from a prudential viewpoint, which aims to protect the in-
terests of small savers who are seeking a low-risk, low-return
means of investing their funds.
It appears from Sections 3 and 4 of this Article that the ar-
gument against pre-specification of profits as a percentage of the
capital in an acceptable investment agency is weaker than objec-
tions to other aspects of the fatwa, which as I have argued relate
more to its relevancy to conventional banks. The quotations in
Tantawi's book suggest that there is no textual basis for the class-
ical consensus on profit and loss sharing rules. Indeed, some
have argued for a basis in canonical texts but that point was not
raised in the IJA rebuttal.67 The latter relied on the claimed con-
sensus in Ibn Qudamah's Al-Mughni. Al-Mughni was in turn
based on the view that pre-specifying profits to the principal in
an investment agency may result in legal disputation since real-
ized profits may be less than the specified amount and may in-
67. On the website www.islamonline.net, Yusuf al-Qaradawi cited Prophetic tradi-
tions on the authority of Rafi' ibn Khadij that report a Prophetic prohibition of pre-
assigned parts leased lands' produce for the owner. A1-Qaradawi argued by analogy that
silent partnership profits should not be fixed as a percentage of the capital. See Yusuf
al-Qaradawi, Fawa'id al-Bunuk wa al-Mudaraba al-Mashru'a [Bank Interest vs. Permissible
Silent Partnerships], at http://www.islamonline.net/fatwa/arabic/FatwaDisplay.asp?h
FatwalD=82025 (displaying al Qaradawi's fatwa in Arabic); see also http://groups.yahoo.
com/group/IBGMalaysia/message/673?source= (translating Qaradawi's fatwa to En-
glish).
I requested a meeting at A1-Azhar in January 2003, in the Saleh Kamel Center for
Islamic Economics, at which the Center Director Dr. M. Abdulhalim Umar was present,
as well as Dr. Mabid A1-Jarhi (Director of IRTI at the Islamic Development Bank), and
two faculty from A1-Azhar: Dr. Abdullah al-Najjar and Dr. M. Rafat Uthman. The latter
two debated the authenticity and relevance of the Prophetic tradition to this case. See
Mahmoud A. E1-Gamal, The Recent Azhar Fatwd and the Possibility of Ribd-Free Banking,
available at http://www.ruf.rice.edu/-elgamal/files/azharfatwafiles/frame.htm. (sum-
marizing discussion provided in Power Point presentation on Azhar fatwa).
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deed be negative, in which case fixed-profit distribution would
violate the rules of investment. Tantawi and the scholars he
quoted argue against that view by invoking the law of large num-
bers that is utilized through diversification and meticulous feasi-
bility studies by banks to ensure that specified profits (interest)
can be paid with a very high probability. If the agent claims that
losses were realized, Tantawi argued, in the text of the fatwa,
that the matter would be settled in courts in any case. On the
other hand, the argument follows that in the vast majority of in-
stances, the larger concern pertains to moral hazard - the
agent's incentive not to disclose the true profitability of his in-
vestments.
Some of the quoted authors by Tantawi also argued that
there is no need to classify contemporary transactions under the
classical/medieval headings. Thus, even if the consensus on
mudarabah is to be upheld, the current contract may be given a
different name. Claims that this would amount to a legal strata-
gem used to circumvent a prohibition may be tolerated from an
industry that holds itself to the highest standards of avoiding
such stratagems. However, we have seen quite clearly that Is-
lamic banks have no trouble replicating interest-bearing debt in-
struments on the asset side of their balance sheets. Moreover, as
we have seen in the HSBC auto finance example, when interest-
bearing deposits from Islamic banks are insufficient to finance
interest (LIBOR-based) debt instruments on the asset side,
banks are allowed to use interest-bearing sources that are not
marketed as Islamic. It would only seem natural for the Islamic
finance industry to accept a variant of the IRI fatwa as a first step
towards mimicking conventional banks' liabilities in the same
manner that they have mimicked the latter's assets. In contrast,
the vehement rejection with which the IRI fatwa was greeted has
only further contributed to the incoherence of Islamic bank ju-
rists' statements and makes the paradox of contemporary Islamic
law and finance all the more impenetrable.
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AUTHOR'S TRANSLATION
Office of the Grand Imam, Rector of Al-Azhar
Investing Funds with Banks that Pre-specify Profits
Dr. Hasan Abbas Zaki, Chairman of the Board of Directors of
the Arab Banking Corporation, sent a letter dated 22/10/2002
to H.E. the Grand Imam Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, Rector
of Al-Azhar. Its text follows:
H.E. Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi, Rector of Al-Azhar
Greetings and prayers for peace, mercy,
and blessings of Allah,
Customers of the International Arab Banking Corporation
forward their funds and savings to the bank to use and invest
them in its permissible dealings, in exchange for profit distribu-
tions that are pre-determined, and the distribution times are
likewise agreed-upon with the customer. We respectfully ask you
for the [Islamic] legal status of this dealing.
[Signature]
He has also attached a sample documentation of the dealing be-
tween an investor and the bank. The sample reads as follows:
The International Arab Banking Corp.
Bank
Date / / 2000 A.D.
Mr/. Account number
Kind Greetings
This is to inform you that your account with us, in the
amount of L.E. 100,000 (only one hundred thousand
Egyptian Pounds) has been renewed. For the period
1/1/2002 until 31/12/2002 A.D.
Rate of return 10% resulting in a return of
L.E. 10,000
Total of deposit + return on distribution date
L.E. 110,000
New amount, including return as of 31/12/2002
L.E.110,000
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His Excellency, the Grand Imam, has forwarded the letter and its
attachment for consideration by the Council of the Islamic Re-
search Institute in its subsequent session.
The Council met on Thursday, 25 Sha'ban, 1423 A.H., corre-
sponding to October 31, 2002 A.D., at which time the above
mentioned subject was presented. After the members' discus-
sions and analysis, the Council determined that investing funds
in banks that pre-specify profits is permissible under Islamic law,
and there is no harm therein.
Due to the special importance of this topic for the public, who
wish to know the Islamic legal ruling regarding investing their
funds with banks that pre-specify profits (as shown by their nu-
merous questions in this matter), the Secretariat General of the
Islamic Research Institute decided to prepare an official fatwa,
supported by the Islamic legal proofs and a summary of the Insti-
tute members' statements. This should give the public a clear
understanding of the issue, thus giving them confidence in the
opinion.
The General Secretariat presented the full fatwa text to the Is-
lamic Research Institute Council during its session on Thursday,
23 Ramadan 1423, corresponding to November 28, 2002 A.D.
Following the reading of the fatwa, and noting members' com-
ments on its text, they approved it.
Text of the Fatwa
Those who deal with the International Arab Banking Corpora-
tion Bank - or any other bank - forward their funds and savings
to the bank as an agent who invests the funds on their behalf in
its permissible dealings, in exchange for a profit distribution that
is pre-determined, and at distribution times that are mutually
agreed-upon ...
This dealing, in this form, is permissible, without any doubt of
impermissibility. This follows from the fact that no canonical
text in the Book of Allah or the prophetic Sunnah forbids this
type of transaction within which profits or returns are pre-speci-
fled, as long as the transaction is concluded with mutual con-
sent.
Allah, transcendent is He, said: "Oh people of faith, do not de-
vour your properties among yourselves unjustly, the exception
being trade conducted by mutual consent . . ." (Al-Nisd: 29)
The verse means: Oh people with true faith, it is not permissible
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for you, and unseemly, that any of you devour the wealth of an-
other in impermissible ways (e.g., theft, usurpation, or usury,
and other forbidden means). In contrast, you are permitted to
exchange benefits through dealings conducted by mutual con-
sent, provided that no forbidden transaction is thus made per-
missible or vice versa. This applies regardless of whether the mu-
tual consent is established verbally, in written form, or in any
other form that indicates mutual agreement and acceptance.
There is no doubt that mutual agreement on pre-specified prof-
its is legally and logically permissible, so that each party will
know his rights.
It is well known that banks only pre-specify profits or returns
based on precise studies of international and domestic markets,
and economic conditions in the society. In addition, returns are
customized for each specific transaction type, given its average
profitability.
Moreover, it is well known that pre-specified profits vary from
one time period to another. For instance, investment certificates
initially specified a return of 4%, which increased subsequently
to more than 15% and is now returning to near 10%.
The parties that specify those changing rates of returns are re-
quired to obey the regulations issued by the relevant govern-
ment agencies.
This pre-specification of profits is beneficial, especially in this
age, when deviations from truth and fair dealing have become
rampant. Thus, pre-specification of profits provides benefits
both to the providers of funds, as well as to the banks that invest
those funds.
It is beneficial to the provider of funds since it allows him to
know his rights without any uncertainty. Thus, he may arrange
the affairs of his life accordingly.
It is also beneficial to those who manage those banks, since the
pre-specification of profits gives them the incentive for working
hard, since they keep all excess profits above what they promised
the provider of funds. This excess profit compensation is justi-
fied by their hard work.
It may be said that banks may lose, thus wondering how they can
pre-specify profits for the investors.
In reply, we say that if banks lose on one transaction, they win on
many others, thus profits can cover losses.
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In addition, if losses are indeed incurred, the dispute will have to
be resolved in court.
In summary, pre-specification of profits to those who forward
their funds to banks and similar institutions through an invest-
ment agency is legally permissible. There is no doubt regarding
the Islamic legality of this transaction, since it belongs to the
general area judged according to benefits, i.e., wherein there are
no explicit texts. In addition, this type of transaction does not
belong to the areas of creed and ritual acts of worship, wherein
changes and other innovations are not permitted.
Based on the preceding, investing funds with banks that pre-
specify profits or returns is Islamically legal, and there is no
harm therein, and Allah knows best,
[signed]
Rector of Al-Azhar
Dr. Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi
27 Ramadan 1423 A.H.
2 December 2002 A.D.
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APPENDIX B: REBUTTAL BY THE ISLAMIC FIQH INSTITUTE
A. Conventional Bank Functions:
Banking laws forbid banks from dealing through profit and
loss-sharing investment. Banks receive loans from the public
in the form of deposits, and restrict their activities - accord-
ing to lawyers and economists - to lending and borrowing
with interest, thus creating credit through lending deposited
funds with interest.
B. Conventional Bank Relationship with Depositors:
The religious law (Shari'ah) and secular law characterizations
of the relationship between depositors and banks is one of
loans, not agency. This is how general and banking laws char-
acterize the relationship. In contrast, investment agency is a
contract according to which an agent invests funds on behalf
of a principal, in exchange for a fixed wage or a share in prof-
its. In this regard, there is a consensus (of religious scholars)
that the principal owns the invested funds, and is therefore
entitled to the profits of investment and liable for its losses,
while the agent is entitled to a fixed wage if the agency stipu-
lated that. Consequently, conventional banks are not invest-
ment-agents for depositors. Banks receive funds from deposi-
tors and use them, thus guaranteeing said funds and render-
ing the contract a loan. In this regard, loans must be repaid
at face value, with no stipulated increase.
C. Conventional Bank Interest is a Form of Forbidden Riba:
Banks' interest on deposits is a form of iba that is forbidden
in the Qur'an and Sunnah as previous decisions and fatawa
have concurred since the second meeting of the Islamic Re-
search Institute in Cairo, Muharram 1385 A.H., May 1965
A.D., attended by eighty-five of the greatest Muslim scholars
and representatives of thirty-five Islamic countries. The first
decision of that conference stated: "[I]nterest on any type of
loan is forbidden iba." The same decision was affirmed by
later decisions of numerous conferences, including: (a list of
conferences and Institute opinions prohibiting bank inter-
est).
D. Pre-specification of Investment Profits in Amount, or as a Per-
centage of the Invested Capital:
It is universally accepted that interest-bearing loans differ
from legal silent partnerships (mudaraba). In loans, the bor-
rower is entitled to profits and bears all losses. In contrast,
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mudaraba is a partnership in profits and the principal bears
financial losses if they occur, as per the Prophet's (P) saying:
"Al-kharaju bi-l-daman profits are justified for the one bearing
liability for losses . . . " (narrated by Ahmad and the authors
of Sunan, with a valid chain of narration).
Thus, jurists of all schools have reached a consensus over the
centuries that pre-specification of investment profits in any
form of partnership is not allowed, be it pre-specified in
amount or as a percentage of the capital. This ruling is based
on the view that such a pre-specification guarantees the prin-
cipal capital, thus violating the essence of partnerships (silent
or otherwise), which is sharing in profits and losses. This con-
sensus is well established and no dissent has been reported.
In this regard, Ibn Qudamah wrote in Al-Mughni (vol. 3, p.
34): "All scholars whose opinions were preserved are in con-
sensus that silent partnership (qirad or mudaraba) is invali-
dated if one or both partners stipulate a known amount of
money as profit." In this regard, consensus of religious schol-
ars is a legal proof on its own.
The council urges Muslims, as it declares this unanimous de-
cision, to earn money only through permissible means, and to
avoid forbidden sources of income in obedience to Allah (S)
and his Messenger (P).
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APPENDIX C: HSBC LAUNCHES ISLAMIC VEHICLE
FINANCE - FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS
2. How can a conventional (interest-based) bank offer a
Shari'ah compliant financial service?
Answer: Islamic law (Shari'ah) does not require that the
seller of a product be Muslim, or that its other services be
Shari'ah compliant as well. This is the considered opinion of
our Shari'ah Supervisory Committee.
Conventional banks charge and pay interest, and the HSBC
Group, of which we are a part, is a conventional bank. But we
are also a customer-driven institution, and we provide
Shari'ah compliant products to serve a genuine financial
need among Muslims. Of course, our Shari'ah compliant
products are available for Muslims and non-Muslims alike.
3. Since HSBC is an interest-based bank, what would be an
acceptable source of funding for HSBC MEFCO? Are
you going to mix conventional and Shari'ah compliant
funds?
Answer: The Shari'ah (Islamic law) does not require that the
seller of a product be Muslim or that his/her own income be
halal (permitted). We will therefore, initially use funds from
conventional sources to finance Amanah Vehicle Finance.
Muslims may be understandably concerned about mixing
conventional funds with Shari'ah compliant funds. It is im-
portant, however, to understand where the two can and can-
not meet according to Islamic law (Shari'ah). To open an
account or invest money, funds must be segregated from in-
terest-based funds so that returns are halal (permitted). To
buy something or obtain financing, however, funds do not
have to be from a halal source. The relationship with the
seller must be in line with the Shari'ah - the seller's relation-
ship with other parties, however, is not the purchaser's re-
sponsibility. This is the opinion of HSBC's Shari'ah Supervi-
sory Committee.
4. How do you calculate the price of Amanah Vehicle Fi-
nance? Are the payments similar to a conventional vehi-
cle loan? If so, is this acceptable under the Shari'ah (Is-
lamic law)?
Answer: HSBC MEFCO determines the rates on Amanah Ve-
hicle Finance using a fixed payment scheme that is competi-
tive with conventional vehicle loans available in the market.
As determined by our Shari'ah Supervisory Committee,
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Shari'ah permits using the conventional market as a bench-
mark.
According to the Shari'ah, the profit rate in a [miurabaha
transaction can be set at any value agreed between the buyer
and seller. Also under [m]urabaha financing, HSBC MEFCO is
acting as a vehicle seller and not a moneylender. There is no
particular reason why a vehicle financed Islamically should be
any more or less expensive than a vehicle financed using a
conventional vehicle loan. The criterion for acceptability by
the Shari'ah is that the transaction be compliant with
Shari'ah, regardless of the price of the good or how that price
is determined.
